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A SINGLE CALL: THE NEED TO AMEND THE
PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIP UNDER
THE FTAIA IN VIEW OF MOTOROLA MOBILITY
Catherine E. Cognetti*
ABSTRACT
In Motorola Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corporation, the
Seventh Circuit dismissed Motorola’s Sherman Act claims under the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act. In doing so, they held
that Motorola’s American parent corporation was a separate entity
from their foreign subsidiaries, and thus barred from bringing suit
under the indirect purchaser doctrine. The effect of the Seventh
Circuit’s decision precluded injured purchasers from recovering
damages under the Sherman Act—Motorola’s subsidiaries could not
sue because their injuries occurred abroad, while Motorola could not
sue because it did not make direct purchases from the antitrust
violators.
Courts have often considered a parent and wholly owned subsidiary
as a single economic entity for the purposes of antitrust laws, such as
under the indirect purchaser doctrine and intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine. While parents and subsidiaries are two distinct entities in a
legal corporate context, there are certain economic benefits for
considering them one unit, such as promoting economic efficiency,
supporting the efficient use of international supply chains, and
encouraging deterrence. Therefore, basic antitrust inquiries, such as
the existence of market power and the possibility of conspiracy,
require focusing on the substance, rather than the form, of
corporations.
This Note seeks to explore why the Seventh Circuit chose not to treat
Motorola’s American parent company and wholly owned foreign
subsidiaries as a single economic unit. It further analyzes the

* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2012, College of

William and Mary. The author would like to thank Mark Patterson for taking the time
to discuss and develop this topic. The author also wishes to thank her family for their
constant support and guidance throughout this process.
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treatment of the parent-subsidiary relationship under the Sherman
Act and Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act. This Note
proposes that an exception needs to be made under the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvement Act to grant an indirect American
parent corporation standing to sue under the Sherman Act when the
direct purchaser is a wholly owned foreign subsidiary and the effects
of a foreign anticompetitive conduct have a direct impact on United
States commerce.
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INTRODUCTION
Beginning as early as 1998, and continuing through 2006,
conspirators secretly agreed to fix liquid crystal display (“LCD”) panel
prices. 1 LCD panels, unlike other cellular telephone inputs, have no
utility apart from their component value.2 The result of this price-fixing
was a highly effective cartel that consistently inflated LCD prices.3 The
conspirators accomplished this price-fixing scheme through targeted
sales of those inflated LCD panels to Motorola Mobility, LLC
(“Motorola”), an American mobile cell phone company that held a top
share of the United States market and sold more phones in the United
States than anywhere else.4 Like many American companies, Motorola
developed manufacturing operations in Asia to take advantage of lower
production costs. 5 However, all aspects of Motorola’s business began
and ended in the United States: they designed the phones, selected the
parts, determined the prices, and dictated the terms on which finished
products were imported and sold to Motorola’s customers in the United
States.6
On the other hand, the conspirators did not sell the LCD panels
directly into the United States. First, the conspirators sold the inflated
LCD panels to Motorola’s wholly owned foreign subsidiaries in China
and Singapore, where the panels were incorporated into the mobile cell
phones. 7 The subsidiaries then imported their LCD products into the
United States for sale at a higher cost. 8 Through this avenue, the
conspirators’ anticompetitive conduct reached United States commerce.9
This price-fixing conspiracy affected well over $23.5 billion worth of
LCD panels imported into the United States, and enabled the

1. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 13, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics
Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-8003), 2014 U.S. 7th Cir.
Briefs LEXIS 277 [hereinafter Appellant’s Opening Brief]. LCD panels, important
components in mobile phones, use a liquid crystal film to display information on a thin
surface. Id.
2. Id. at 12.
3. Id. at 13.
4. Id. at 5.
5. Id. at 7.
6. Id. at 16-17.
7. Id. at 21.
8. Id. at 26.
9. Id. at 14.
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conspirators to impose overcharges of more than $2 billion on those
imports. 10 But because these antitrust activities took place abroad, all
parties seeking to bring suit had to first bring their case within the
confines of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”).11
The indirect purchasers in the United States, in this case Motorola’s
parent company, if not confronted with the indirect purchaser doctrine,
might have standing if the company was able to show that “a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on United States
commerce gave rise to their claim.12
The above facts explain the background of a recent Seventh Circuit
case: Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics Corporation. 13 The Seventh
Circuit’s treatment of the parent-subsidiary relationship in Motorola
Mobility, as compared to other antitrust doctrines, is the focus of this
Note. While several antitrust doctrines, such as the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine and indirect purchaser doctrine, treat a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary as one entity, the Seventh Circuit declined to
follow a similar approach in Motorola Mobility.14 In fact, the Seventh

10. Brief for the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 3, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015)
(No. 14-1122), 2015 WL 1798940, at *2-3 [hereinafter Brief for AAI].
11. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012). The FTAIA creates a general rule that antitrust laws
under the Sherman Act shall not “apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations.” Id. To establish an
exception, the American parent company would have to show that the conspirators’
actions had “a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on United States
commerce, and that such an effect “gives rise to a claim.” Id.; see infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d
816 (7th Cir. 2014).
14. The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine stated that a conspiracy in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act exists where one individual owned or controlled
separately incorporated conspiring companies. See generally United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). The doctrine was overturned in Copperweld Corp., where
the Supreme Court held that a parent corporation is incapable of conspiring with its
wholly owned subsidiary. See Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 779. The indirect
purchaser doctrine limits recovery of damages in antitrust violations only to those
entities that dealt directly with the cartel, or when the direct purchaser is owned or
controlled by another entity, such as a subsidiary. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 736 n.16 (1977). In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held in Motorola Mobility that the
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Circuit refused to collapse Motorola’s parent corporation and their
foreign subsidiaries into one economic unit, arguing “corporate
formalities should be respected unless one of the recognized
justifications for piercing the veil, or otherwise deeming a parent and a
subsidiary one, is present.”15 The inconsistent treatment of the parentsubsidiary relationship under the FTAIA and other antitrust doctrines
under the Sherman Act is perplexing; there is no legitimate rationale for
the difference.16
In Motorola Mobility, the Seventh Circuit decided to treat
Motorola’s parent and subsidiary companies as separate economic units,
and dismissed Motorola’s Sherman Act claims.17 The court gave three
rationales for its decision. First, the court determined that Motorola’s
antitrust claim failed because Motorola could not satisfy the “gives rise
to” prong of the FTAIA. 18 Because Motorola’s American parent
company was injured abroad when it purchased the price-fixed
component, the effect in the United States of the price-fixing was not
enough to give rise to an antitrust claim.19 Second, the court held that
Motorola could not satisfy the Illinois Brick doctrine.20 The price-fixed
LCD panels were bought directly by Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries,
and then sold to Motorola, making Motorola an indirect purchaser. 21
Thus, Motorola was barred from bringing suit under Illinois Brick. 22
Lastly, the court observed that Motorola could not satisfy the choice-oflaw rules. 23 Foreign-injured corporations ordinarily must sue in the
American parent company could not sue for damages because the direct purchaser was
a wholly owned foreign subsidiary. See generally Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816.
15. Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 820.
16. See generally Robert E. Connolly, Repeal the FTAIA! (or at Least Consider It
as Coextensive with Hartford Fire), CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2014.
17. See Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 820.
18. See Randy M. Stutz, The FTAIA in Flux: Foreign Component-Goods Cases
Have Tripped, But Have They Fallen?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 2015, at 4.
19. See Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 823. The court’s reasoning reads as follows:
“Remember that the [FTAIA] requires that the effect of an anticompetitive practice on
domestic U.S. commerce must, to be subject to the Sherman Act, give rise to an
antitrust cause of action. [Motorola] . . . would have been injured abroad when [it]
purchased the price-fixed components.” Id.
20. Stutz, supra note 18, at 4.
21. Id.
22. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730 (1977) (barring indirect purchasers
from bringing suit under section 1 of the Sherman Act).
23. Stutz, supra note 18, at 4.
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country in which it is incorporated and operates, or the country where
they took delivery of the cartelized goods. 24 Therefore, Motorola had
standing to sue abroad, where the injury occurred, rather than in the
United States.25 Furthermore, the court noted the prevalence of global
supply chains in the current economy and predicted that to extend
application of the Sherman Act to the activities of the defendants in this
case would result in an “enormous[] increase [in] the global reach of the
Sherman Act, creating friction with many foreign countries.”26
As the Seventh Circuit noted, international global supply chains are
prolific in modern business. The many businesses that hope to remain
competitive in the globalized economy have started to expand their
operations abroad. 27 After all, “[n]othing is more common nowadays
than for products imported to the United States to include components
that the producers bought from foreign manufacturers.” 28 A common
organizational strategy involves a domestic parent company establishing
a foreign subsidiary that acts as a link in the parent’s global supply
chain, such as the one that existed in Motorola Mobility. 29 These
corporate structures provide the American parent company with many
competitive advantages: increased sourcing, efficient manufacturing,
cheaper transportation, and wider distribution. 30 However, the
advantages end when the foreign subsidiary falls prey to anticompetitive
conduct abroad.
Consider the following three scenarios: (1) an American company
has a warehouse in China; it buys components in China and stores them
briefly in the warehouse there before sending them on to the United
States; (2) an American company owns a manufacturing plant in China;
it buys components in China, manufacturers the products in China and
then ships the finalized products into the United States to be assembled
into the finished product; and (3) an American company in either
scenario (1) or (2) does the same thing through a Chinese subsidiary. In
24.
25.

Id.
See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d
816, 818 (7th Cir. 2014).
26. Id. at 824.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 817.
30. See Jeffrey H. Smith, Note, Call Me, Maybe? The Seventh Circuit’s Call in
Motorola Mobility, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2063, 2063 (2015).
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all three of these scenarios, the substance of the transactions is the same
(the American company is importing products manufactured abroad),
but the form is different (the relationship between the American
company and manufacturing plant). This Note argues that regardless of
the form, all three scenarios should all be treated similarly.
This Note will explore why the Seventh Circuit chose not to treat
Motorola’s American parent company and wholly owned foreign
subsidiary as a single economic unit. Part I of this Note outlines the
history of the Sherman Act, focusing primarily on the rationale behind
the creation of the FTAIA. Part II analyzes the treatment of the parentsubsidiary relationship in other antitrust contexts; specifically, the
indirect purchaser doctrine and the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
Part III proposes that an exception needs to be made under the FTAIA to
provide an indirect American parent corporation standing to sue under
the Sherman Act when the direct purchaser is a wholly owned foreign
subsidiary and the effects of foreign anticompetitive conduct have a
direct impact on United States commerce.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY: THE PURPOSE OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
AND RATIONALE FOR THE CREATION OF THE FTAIA
A. THE SHERMAN ACT AND ITS FUNCTION
United States antitrust law “covers foreign conduct producing a
substantial intended effect in the United States.”31 The purpose of the
Sherman Act is to promote competition and to prohibit the
monopolization and restraint of trade. 32 One of the Sherman Act’s
express goals, according to Senator Sherman, is “to combat the trusts
and cartels which . . . ‘were imported from abroad.’”33 As a result, the

31.
32.

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797 & n.24 (1993).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is directed toward anticompetitive contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies, and as such, requires more than one actor. Section 2 is
designed to prevent monopolization and can therefore apply to unilateral conduct. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2012).
33. Hearings on H.R. 2326 before the Subcomm. on Monopolies & Commercial
Law of the H. Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong. 42 (1981) (statement of Prof. James A.
Rahl).
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Sherman Act is applied to foreign conduct by international conspiracies
to the extent they cause anticompetitive effects in the United States.34
Section 1 of the Sherman Act applies to “every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations.” 35 Similarly, section 2 of the Sherman Act applies to the
monopolization of “any part of the trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations.”36 The pre-FTAIA Sherman Act is silent
on its application to conduct occurring outside the United States.37
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., the Supreme Court
first considered the international reach of the Sherman Act.38 There, the
Court held that the Sherman Act did not govern anticompetitive acts that
took place in Panama and Costa Rica.39 The Court articulated an “almost
universal rule . . . that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must
be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”40
Over time, the strict territorial interpretation of the Sherman Act
softened and courts began to exercise jurisdiction over certain
extraterritorial actions that affected competition in the United States.41
Then, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (“Alcoa”), Judge
Learned Hand developed an effects test for determining when
extraterritorial activity could be subject to liability under the Sherman
Act.42 Under this test, the extraterritorial activities at issue must have
been intended to affect imports and must have actually affected them in

34. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 600
(1951), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984); United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 348 (1947), abrogated by Cont’l
T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106, 172, 182 (1911).
35. Sherman Act of 1890 § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
36. Sherman Act of 1890 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1974).
38. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
39. See id.
40. Id. at 356.
41. Joseph P. Bauer, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We Really
Want to Return to American Banana?, 65 ME. L. REV. 3, 7-8 (2012).
42. See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945), superseded by statute, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982 § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
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order to fall within the reach of the Sherman Act. 43 Judge Hand
distinguished American Banana and asserted that it was “settled law”
that “any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends.”44 Under this test, “the Sherman
Act applie[d] to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in
fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.”45
B. ANTITRUST STANDING UNDER THE FTAIA
Following Alcoa, the effects test was applied in a variety of forms,
as numerous courts struggled to create a framework for analyzing the
international reach of the antitrust laws. 46 Seeking to resolve the
conflicts regarding the application of the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial
reach, Congress passed the FTAIA in 1982.47 The FTAIA was part of
the congressional attempt to state clear rules for identifying the
applicability of the antitrust laws to certain foreign activities.48
Congress had two primary concerns in passing the statute: (1) that
United States courts would be overwhelmed with lawsuits regarding
actions that had minimal effects on domestic commerce and primarily
served foreign interests; and (2) that the inconsistent application of the
Sherman Act was having a detrimental effect on international
commerce.49 Congress further stated that the purpose of the FTAIA was
to address the “apparent perception among businessmen that American
antitrust laws are a barrier to joint export activities that promote
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 444.
Id. at 443.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
Compare Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 610-13 (9th
Cir. 1976) (applying a test that balances considerations of international comity with
domestic effects, yet noting that “[e]ven among American courts and commentators,
however, there is no consensus on how far the jurisdiction should extend.”), superseded
by statute, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 6a, as
recognized in McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
with Nat’l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying
an effects test similar to that used in Alcoa).
47. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96
Stat. 1246.
48. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 307(a), 96 Stat.
1233, 1237.
49. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2-3 (1982).
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efficiencies in the export of American goods and services.”50 For these
reasons, the FTAIA was enacted to protect American companies from
the application of the antitrust laws when their allegedly anticompetitive
activities affected only foreign markets while also preserving the
Sherman Act claims of American companies and consumers with
respect to conduct that caused domestic harms.51
The FTAIA is consistent with the longstanding view of how the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct, the anticompetitive effects of
which at home and abroad are “inextricably bound up.”52 In such cases,
even wholly foreign plaintiffs can invoke the protections of the Sherman
Act. 53 Furthermore, the FTAIA clarifies that conduct affecting only
foreign commerce is outside the scope of the Sherman Act regardless of
whether the defendant is an American company or not, thus “assur[ing]
foreign countries and their citizens that they would not be swept into a
U.S. court to answer under U.S. law for actions that were of no
legitimate concern to the United States.”54 However, this would imply
that if a foreign antitrust violation creates domestic harm, this conduct
could be brought under the FTAIA.55
Despite the passage of the FTAIA, controversy about the
appropriate scope of the antitrust laws has not ended. Lower courts have

50.
51.

Id.
Supplemental Brief for Petitioner Motorola Mobility, LLC at 11, Motorola
Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 2014)
(No. 14-8003), 2014 WL 3586199, at *11 [hereinafter Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief]
(citing Export Trading Company Act of 1982 § 102(b), 15 U.S.C. § 4001); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 7-8 (stating that the FTAIA was passed to allow U.S.
businesses to freely compete in overseas markets, so as to increase United States
exports of products and services.) This is confirmed by Supreme Court case law. See,
e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004)
(“[A]pplication of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct [under the
FTAIA] is . . . reasonable, and hence consistent with principles of prescriptive comity,
insofar as they reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign
anticompetitive conduct has caused.”).
52. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 171-72 (citation and emphasis omitted).
53. Id.
54. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 962 (7th Cir.
2003) (en banc) (Wood, J., dissenting), overruled by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc.,
683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
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accurately described the FTAIA as “convoluted,”56 and an “inelegantly
phrased”57 “web of words.”58 The statute provides as follows:
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with
foreign nations unless—
(1) such conduct has direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effect—
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with
foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of
a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United
States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of [the
59
Sherman Act], other than this section.

The FTAIA begins by placing all extraterritorial activity other than
import trade and import commerce outside the reach of the Sherman
Act.60 It then pulls some activity back within the Sherman Act’s reach
when two requirements are met.61 First, the conduct must have a “direct,
56. Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir. 2002),
overruled by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir.
2011).
57. Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997)),
overruled by Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d 462.
58. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014), amended by
778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2015).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
60. This is known as the “import trade or commerce” exception. The Sherman Act
will apply where the defendants are involved in import trade or import commerce. See
15 U.S.C. § 6a. Several courts applying the FTAIA have held that what is relevant
under the import provisions is “whether the alleged conduct by the defendants
‘involved’ import trade or commerce, not . . . whether the plaintiff’s conduct, which is
not being challenged as violative of the Sherman Act, ‘involved’ import trade or
commerce.” Carpet Grp., 227 F.3d at 71; see also Turicentro, 303 F.3d 293; Kruman v.
Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogated by F. Hoffman-La Roche
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
61. 15 U.S.C.§ 6a(2).
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substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce.62
Second, the effect must “give[] rise to” a Sherman Act claim.63 Congress
did not intend the FTAIA to depart from the long-settled rule that “the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and
did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.”64
II. ONE OR NONE: HOW TO TREAT THE PARENT-SUBSIDIARY ISSUE
Courts have often considered a parent and wholly owned subsidiary
as a single economic unit for the purposes of antitrust law. 65 While
parents and subsidiaries are two distinct entities in a corporate context,
there are certain economic benefits for considering them one unit under
antitrust law. 66 Consider the three scenarios mentioned in the
introduction: while the form of the three corporations were all different
and distinct, the substance was the same—the components were bought
and manufactured abroad and then shipped into the United States.67 To
promote economic efficiency, a corporation will choose the least costly
form. 68 Therefore, while there are corporate law implications for
creating subsidiaries, reliance on this separation is not needed in an
antitrust context given that economic efficiencies must be taken into
account.69
The legal form of a corporation defines “the scope of its liabilities
but does not circumscribe economic units in the marketplace.” 70
However, the “discrepancy between the scope of legal entities (form)
and economic units (substance)” has caused confusion among many
courts.71 Courts do not “fully recognize that corporations use the legal
form for many purposes that do not define their economic substance.”72

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

This is known as the “direct effect” prong. Id. § 6a(1).
This is known as the “gives rise to” prong. Id. § 6a(2).
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795-96 (1993).
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.C.
See supra Introduction.
See Smith, supra note 30, at 2063-64, 2064 n.8.
Id.
See Barak Orbach, The Durability of Formalism in Antitrust, 100 IOWA L. REV.
2197, 2206 (2015).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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For example, when corporations are affiliated, such as wholly owned
subsidiaries, a court’s “reliance on the legal form may distort antitrust
analysis.”73 Additionally, basic antitrust inquiries, such as the existence
of market power, require clear definitions of market participants that
focus on the substance, rather than the form, of corporations. 74
Therefore, these legal and economic implications must be factored into a
court’s analysis for the purposes of antitrust violations.75
A. THE PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
Courts have often considered a parent and wholly owned subsidiary
as a single economic entity for the purposes of antitrust laws, such as
under the indirect purchaser doctrine and intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine.76 While parents and subsidiaries are two distinct entities in a
legal corporate context, there are certain economic benefits for
considering them one unit, such as promoting economic efficiency,
supporting the efficient use of international supply chains, and
encouraging deterrence. 77 However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Motorola Mobility is inconsistent with these antitrust doctrines, holding
that Motorola’s parent company and wholly owned subsidiaries were
two separate entities, and thus barred from bringing a claim under the
FTAIA.78
1. Indirect Purchaser Doctrine
The indirect purchaser doctrine prohibits indirect purchasers of
goods or services from recovering antitrust damages from violators.79
The doctrine evolved from section 4 of the Clayton Act.80 It was created
through two separate Supreme Court decisions that considered antitrust

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part II.C.1-2.
Orbach, supra note 70, at 2206.
See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d
816, 820 (7th Cir. 2014).
79. See generally Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
80. Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits “[a]ny person . . . injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antirust laws” to bring suit for treble
damages. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
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problems associated with multiparty supply chains. The first case
provides that a direct purchaser can recover the full amount of an illegal
overcharge, regardless of whether that cost is passed on to downstream
buyers. 81 The second provides that downstream buyers do not have
standing regardless of how much of the overcharge is passed on to
them.82
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.83 and Illinois Brick Corp. v. Illinois84 limited recovery
of damages in cases of supra-competitive overcharges to only those
entities that dealt directly with the cartel responsible for the overcharge,
or the “direct purchaser.” 85 The result left subsequent, or “indirect
purchasers,” who often suffer substantial harm, without a remedy or
standing to sue. 86 The rule serves to avoid the difficulties of
“apportion[ing] recovery among all potential plaintiffs . . . from direct
purchasers to middlemen to ultimate consumers.”87 It further seeks to
eliminate the possibility of duplicative recovery and promotes
enforcement by purchasers who have been most directly injured by the
alleged violation.88
To understand the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Brick, it is
important to first consider the decision in Hanover Shoe. There, a shoe
manufacturer sued a manufacturer of shoe machinery who had
monopolized the shoe machinery industry in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act.89 The defendant argued that it should be allowed to show
that the plaintiff had not been injured by the antitrust violation because
the plaintiff had passed on the costs of the violation to its consumers, the
purchasers of the shoes, and thus was not harmed.90 The Court had to
address whether an alleged illegal monopolist could use this “passing-

81.
(1968).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See generally Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481
See generally Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. 720.
Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. 481.
Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. 720.
See generally id.
See id. at 738-42.
See id. at 728-33.
See id. at 731 n.11.
See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
See id. at 491-92.
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on” defense.91 The Court rejected this argument, holding that there is no
“passing-on” defense to a suit by a direct purchaser. 92 If the defense
were effective, antitrust violators “would retain the fruits of their
illegality.”93 Instead, the Court decided to grant the direct purchaser the
entire award, acknowledging that this would be a windfall. 94 The
rationale for this windfall was that concentrating the full recovery for
the overcharge in the direct purchasers would more effectively enforce
the antitrust laws, rather than allowing every potential plaintiff to sue
only for the amount it could show that it individually absorbed.95
In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court dealt with the flip side of the
“passing-on” defense: offensive “passing-on.” 96 There, the plaintiffs,
represented by the State of Illinois suing on behalf of itself and local
governmental entities, claimed overcharges in connection with various
construction projects.97 The defendants, manufacturers and distributors
of concrete block alleged to be in collusion, sold the block to masonry
contractors who submitted bids to general contractors. 98 The general
contractors in turn submitted bids to customers such as the plaintiffs.99
Rather than facing an antitrust violator seeking to reduce its liability by
asserting a “passing-on” defense, the Court addressed whether an
indirect purchaser could recover damages by proving overcharges had
been passed on. 100 The Court considered two ways to avoid multiple
liabilities: (1) allow indirect purchasers to sue by overruling Hanover
Shoe; or (2) retain Hanover Shoe and preclude indirect purchasers from
suing.101 The Court chose the latter.102
Like Hanover Shoe, the Illinois Brick opinion was grounded on
policy considerations.103 The overriding consideration was symmetry.104
91. The “passing-on” defense is a claim that the direct purchaser was not injured
because it raised its prices in response to the monopolist’s price increase, absorbing
none of the increased costs itself. See id. at 491-94.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 494.
94. See id. (providing the full damage award to the direct purchaser).
95. See id.
96. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 753 (1977).
97. Id. at 726-27.
98. Id. at 726.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 727-28.
101. Id. at 736.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 736-39.
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If a defendant manufacturer or supplier was not permitted to employ a
“passing-on” defense, as was held in Hanover Shoe, an indirect
purchaser plaintiff would not be permitted to recover passed-on
damages from that constrained manufacturer or supplier.105 As the Court
noted in Hanover Shoe, if they had permitted the “passing-on” defense
to be utilized by defendants, to ensure a return to optimal levels of
deterrence, plaintiffs other than the direct purchaser would need to be
allowed to sue the monopolist for damages. 106 And the Court was
unwilling to “open the door to duplicative recoveries” due to the
uncertainties and difficulties in analyzing price and output decisions, as
well as the cost to the judicial system.107 The Court reasoned that the
“antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the
full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers” 108 because
wrongdoers would be less likely to retain the fruits of their illegality for
want of an economically motivated challenger to bring suit.109
a. Exceptions to the Indirect Purchaser Doctrine
While the direct purchaser standing requirement of Illinois Brick
has faced criticism from scholars, as well as states, the standing
requirement continues to apply to federal antitrust claims.110 However,
the indirect purchaser doctrine is not absolute. There have been many
exceptions that have evolved over the past several decades, such as the
“own or control” exception and the “co-conspirator” exception. 111 When
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 736-740, 737 n.18.
See id. at 736-47.
Id. at 745-47.
Id. at 730-31 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251

(1972)).
108. Id. at 734-35.
109. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
110. See generally Christopher T. Casamassima & Tammy A. Tsoumas, The Illinois
Brick Wall: Standing Tall, COMPETITION, Spring 2011, at 67.
111. Another famous exception to the Illinois Brick doctrine is the cost-plus
exception. This exception is not relevant to this Note, so it is not discussed in more
detail. The cost-plus exception states that the Illinois Brick rule does not apply where an
indirect purchaser buys a predetermined quantity of price-fixed goods from a direct
purchaser operating under a “cost-plus” contract as the “pre-existing cost-plus contract
makes easy the normally complicated task of demonstrating that the overcharge has not
been absorbed by the direct purchaser.” Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 732 n.12. The direct
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applying an exception to Illinois Brick, courts often discuss policy
reasons such as prohibiting duplicative liability, encouraging efficient
enforcement of the antitrust laws, and avoiding overly complex
proceedings. 112 The “own or control” and “co-conspirator” exceptions
share a common logic: where the relationship between the parties in a
multi-tiered distribution chain is such that plaintiffs are the first injured
parties of alleged anticompetitive agreements, the rationale for the
Illinois Brick bar disappears.113 Therefore, when one of these exceptions
applies, indirect purchasers may be permitted to sue.114
Under the “own or control” and “co-conspirator” exceptions, courts
have often considered a parent corporation and its subsidiaries as a
single entity. 115 The Supreme Court expressly recognized an “own or
control” exception to Illinois Brick, and courts have “expanded [the
exception] to include instances where the defendant owns or controls the
intermediary that sold the goods to the indirect-purchaser plaintiff.”116
When the indirect purchaser and direct purchaser act as a single entity,
courts grant indirect purchasers standing to sue for antitrust damages
because it preserves “an undiluted incentive in the hands of the most
likely enforcer” of the antitrust laws. 117 Additionally, under the “coconspirator” exception, courts have held that “Illinois Brick does not
limit suits [where] . . . [t]he consumer plaintiff is a direct purchaser from
the dealer who . . . has conspired illegally with the manufacturer with
purchaser, in setting the price at which to sell to the indirect purchaser, automatically
adds a contractually predetermined sum to the price he paid the initial seller. Id.
112. See, e.g., Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (9th Cir.
1984); In re Mercedes-Benz Anti-Trust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 366-67 (D.N.J.
2001); In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1295-96 (D. Md.
1981).
113. See Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir.
1980) (“[The indirect purchaser] cannot sue . . . only for the portion of the overcharge
that was passed on to it. . . . The only alternatives are to allow [it] to sue . . . for the
entire amount of the overcharge . . . or not to allow [it] to sue. . . . [The latter] would be
intolerable.”).
114. See Ill. Brick, 341 U.S. at 735.
115. See, e.g., Royal Printing Co., 621 F.2d 323; Animal Sci. Prods. Co. v. Hebei
Welcome Pharm. Co. (In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig.), 279 F.R.D. 90 (E.D.N.Y.
2012).
116. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 279 F.R.D. at 101 (citing In re Industrial
Diamonds Antitrust Litig., 119 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
117. Matthew M. Duffy, Note, Chipping Away at the Illinois Brick Wall: Expanding
Exceptions to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1709, 1733 (2012).
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respect to the very price paid by the consumer.” 118 Both of these
exceptions help avoid one of the primary concerns of Illinois Brick:
liability to multiple defendants for treble damages.119
Under the “co-conspirator” exception, a co-conspirator does not
need to be named if the co-conspirator is a subsidiary of another
defendant. 120 In Royal Printing Company v. Kimberly-Clark
Corporation, the Ninth Circuit held that Illinois Brick does not bar an
indirect purchaser’s suit where the direct purchaser is a division or
subsidiary of a co-conspirator.121 There, a printing company and other
small businesses brought suit against ten manufacturers of paper
products.122 The plaintiffs had never bought paper products directly from
any of the defendants, but instead purchased through various
wholesalers.123 The Ninth Circuit permitted the suit to proceed on the
basis that plaintiffs could demonstrate that the wholesaler was a
subsidiary of one of the defendants.124 For those wholesalers that were
not wholly owned or controlled by the defendants, plaintiffs had no
standing to sue because they were indirect purchasers.125 Thus, the “coconspirator” exception applies when “there is no realistic possibility that
the direct purchaser will sue its supplier over the antitrust violation.”126
Under the “own or control” exception, it is well established that the
indirect purchaser doctrine does not apply where the supposed
intermediary is controlled by one of the disputed parties. 127 In fact,
courts applying Illinois Brick have held that where an agent does not
function as an independent economic entity in the chain of distribution,

118. Brennan v. Concord EFS, Inc. (In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig.), 686 F.3d 741,
750 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 346h (3d
ed. 2007)).
119. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1982).
120. See, e.g., Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 931 (3d Cir.
1986).
121. Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1980).
122. Id. at 324.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 326.
125. Id. at 327-28.
126. Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1145-46 (9th Cir.
2003).
127. In re Mercedes-Benz Anti-Trust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 366 (D.N.J. 2001)
(citing Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977)).
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the purchaser is a direct purchaser from the seller. 128 In In re Sugar
Industry Antitrust Litigation, a candy wholesaler purchased candy from
a manufacturer who was involved in a price-fixing scheme in the sugar
industry.129 While the price-fixed commodity, sugar, had been combined
with other ingredients to form a different product, candy, the pricefixing enhanced the profits of the candy manufacturers.130 Because the
alleged price-fixer owned the direct purchaser, the court held that the
claims were properly asserted. 131 Therefore, without the “own or
control” exception, antitrust violators could avoid liability by creating a
subsidiary or otherwise controlled “middlemen” to take the fall, thereby
preventing indirect purchasers from bringing suit.132
The Supreme Court first recognized this exception in footnote
sixteen of Illinois Brick, which stated that the original “own or control”
exception to the indirect purchaser doctrine applies when the direct and
indirect purchasers function as one entity.133 When applying the “own or
control” exception, “the unanimous view is that the exception applies
not only where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its
customer, but also where it is owned or controlled by its supplier.”134
Thus, where an indirect purchaser and direct purchaser act as a single
entity, courts grant indirect purchasers standing because it preserves “an
undiluted incentive in the hands of the most likely enforcer” of the

128. See In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 505
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Diskin v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 6347, 1994
WL 330229, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1994)) (questioning “whether use of the agent
constitutes a separate step in the vertical distribution of the . . . product.”).
129. Stotter & Co. v. Amstar Corp. (In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig.), 579 F.2d
13, 15 (3d Cir. 1978).
130. Id. at 17-18.
131. Id. at 19.
132. See id.
133. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977) (“Another situation in
which market forces have been superseded and the pass-on defense might be permitted
is where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer.”); see also In re
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petrol. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 497 F. Supp. 218,
226 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (first citing In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d at 19;
then citing Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980)).
134. In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (D. Md. 1981);
see also In re Mercedes-Benz Anti-Trust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 366 (D.N.J. 2001)
(“It is also well-established that the rationale of Illinois Brick’s bar to indirect purchaser
suits does not apply where the supposed intermediary is controlled by one or the other
of the parties.”).
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antitrust laws. 135 If an employee directly purchases an overcharged
product and is subsequently reimbursed by her employer (the indirect
purchaser), the direct purchaser “retain[s] no independent harm.”136 This
exception is different from the “co-conspirator” exception, 137 but
similarly permits indirect purchasers to sue when there “is no realistic
possibility that the direct purchaser will sue its supplier over the antitrust
violation.”138
The subsequent interpretations of footnote sixteen seemingly fit the
description of Motorola in Motorola Mobility. 139 The footnote sixteen
exception applies where the consumer owns or controls the intermediary
and where the seller owns or controls the more direct purchaser.140 The
comparison can be further strengthened because while most courts often
contemplate the application of the “own or control” exception in the
context of wholly owned subsidiaries, some see no reason why it could
not exist through a contractual agency relationship. 141 However, in
Motorola Mobility, Motorola owned the intermediary foreign subsidiary,
thus meeting this requirement.
Often, the “own or control” exception is applied when the direct
purchaser is owned or controlled by the violator.142 Every rationale for
Illinois Brick vanishes in this situation because apportionment is
irrelevant when direct purchasers are unwilling to sue, and deterrence
will be underserved unless the only likely plaintiffs, indirect purchasers,
are allowed to sue.143 Contrarily, other courts, such as the one in Jewish
Hospital Association of Louisville, Kentucky, Inc. v. Stewart Mechanical
Enterprises, Inc., expanded the exception beyond the parent-subsidiary
135.
136.
137.

Duffy, supra note 117, at 1733.
Id. at 1733-34.
Under the “co-conspirator” exception, courts have held that when there are
allegations of a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy, a plaintiff’s claim is not barred by
Illinois Brick. See Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir.
1984).
138. Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1145-46 (9th Cir.
2003).
139. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977).
140. See In re Mercedes-Benz Anti-Trust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 366 (D.N.J.
2001) (citing Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16).
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th
Cir. 1980).
143. See Duffy, supra note 117, at 1743.
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relationship to cases where there is a “functional economic or other
unity between the direct purchaser and either the defendant or the
indirect purchaser [such] that there effectively has been only one
sale.”144 While most cases involve a unity between the direct purchaser
and defendant, there is no reason that this exception should not similarly
apply to the plaintiff.145 Furthermore, footnote sixteen of Illinois Brick
hints that the exception can apply to a plaintiff.146
2. Intra-enterprise Conspiracy Doctrine
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine rested on the premise that
certain multidivisional business enterprises contain enough actors
necessary to meet section 1 of the Sherman Act’s conspiracy
requirement.147 It provided that a parent company and its wholly owned
subsidiary could satisfy the requirements of a conspiracy that could
unlawfully restrain trade under the Sherman Act. 148 Internal decisions
made among these subsidiaries or with the parent company were,
therefore, subject to section 1 liability as an illegal conspiracy if they
restrained trade from outsiders.149
The parent-subsidiary relationship had been treated as a single
entity within the economic doctrine of the intra-enterprise conspiracy. In
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,150 the Supreme Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit’s finding that a parent and wholly owned
subsidiary, who conspired to restrain trade in the structural steel tubing
market by warning several prospective suppliers and customers against
dealing with a potential competitor, violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act.151 The Seventh Circuit’s rationale was that the liability of a parent
and its wholly owned subsidiary was appropriate “when there is enough
separation between the two entities to make treating them as two

144. Jewish Hosp. Ass’n v. Stewart Mech. Enters., Inc., 628 F.2d 971, 975 (6th Cir.
1980).
145. See Duffy, supra note 117, at 1743.
146. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977).
147. See Ann I. Jones, Comment, Intraenterprise Antitrust Conspiracy: A Decisionmaking Approach, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1732, 1732-34 (1983).
148. See generally id.
149. Id. at 1733.
150. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
151. Id. at 755-58.
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independent actors sensible.”152 However, the Supreme Court reversed
this decision, limiting the inquiry to the narrow issue of whether a parent
and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 153 In doing so, the Supreme Court
established a different way of viewing when a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary would be considered a single entity.154 According to
the Supreme Court, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine provided
that section 1 liability is not foreclosed merely because a parent and its
subsidiary are subject to common ownership.155 Thus, Copperweld held
that, for the purpose of section 1 of the Sherman Act, a parent
corporation is incapable of conspiring with its wholly owned
subsidiaries.156
Underlying Copperweld’s rejection of the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine was the Court’s assumption that the Sherman Act
treats unilateral actions under section 2 of the Sherman Act less harshly
than concerted action under section 1. 157 This is because certain
agreements, such as horizontal price-fixing, are thought so inherently
anticompetitive that they are per se illegal without inquiry into the harm
they actually cause.158 Conversely, vertical price-fixing agreements hold
the promise of increasing a firm’s efficiency and enabling it to compete
more efficiently. 159 Therefore, these combinations are judged under a
“rule of reason” analysis. 160 This “rule of reason” gives “the courts
adequate latitude to examine the substance rather than the form of an
arrangement.”161 In other words, the corporate interrelationships of the
conspirators are not indicative of the applicability of the Sherman Act.162

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 759 (citation omitted).
Id. at 767.
See id.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 767-68.
Id. at 768 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
Id.
Id. (citing Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Chi.
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-40 (1918)).
161. Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 760 (majority opinion) (citing Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344, 360-61, 376-77 (1933)).
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In Copperweld, the Court cited several economic reasons to treat a
parent and subsidiary as one entity. Corporations delegate
responsibilities to autonomous units to minimize costs and provide
efficiencies from decentralization.163 Indeed, creating a rule that would
punish corporations from this decentralization would serve no useful
antitrust purpose. 164 Furthermore, the coordinated activity of a parent
and its subsidiaries must be treated as a single unit for the purposes of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.165 This is because a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest: common objectives,
one corporate consciousness, and the same course of action.166 Because
of these similarities, there is no sudden joining of corporate resources,
and therefore no justification of section 1 scrutiny. 167 A section 1
“agreement” may be found when “the conspirators had a unity of
purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds
in an unlawful arrangement.” 168 Because a parent and wholly owned
subsidiary always have a “unity of purpose,” the term “agreement”
within section 1 of the Sherman Act lacks meaning.169 If this unity starts
to waiver and the subsidiary fails to act in the parent’s best interest, the
parent may assert full control over the subsidiary and “rein” in their
actions.170
In making its decision to overrule the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine in Copperweld, the Supreme Court looked at substance rather
than form. The doctrine looked at the form of the enterprise’s structure,
and thus “ignore[d] the reality.” 171 Antitrust liability, the Court held,

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id. at 771.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (citing Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 771-72. Some courts apply a “single entity” test, that sets forth various
criteria for evaluating whether a given parent and subsidiary are capable of conspiring
with one another. However, when a subsidiary is wholly owned, the factors in the test
are insufficient to describe a separate economic entity for purposes of the Sherman Act.
Therefore, the parent and subsidiary must be viewed as a single economic unit. Id. at
772 n.18 (citing Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 588-89 (8th Cir. 1981); Las
Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1979); Photovest
Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 727 (7th Cir. 1979)).
171. Id. at 772.
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should not depend on how a corporate subunit is structured. 172 The
economic or legal considerations that lead a corporate management to
choose one structure over the other bears no relevance to whether the
conduct threatens competition.173 A corporation has complete power to
maintain a wholly owned subsidiary regardless of the form and may
adopt a form for valid management purposes. 174 “If antitrust liability
turned on the garb in which a corporate subunit was clothed, parent
corporations would be encouraged to convert subsidiaries into
unincorporated divisions.”175 This would serve no valid antitrust goals,
and would merely deprive consumers and producers of the benefits that
the subsidiary form may yield.176
B. THE PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FTAIA
1. Motorola Mobility Background
Motorola Mobility involved an American parent company whose
foreign subsidiaries were part of a global supply chain involved in the
production of mobile phones. 177 The defendants in the litigation
allegedly participated in anticompetitive conduct by fixing the prices of
LCD panels, a necessary component of the phones.178 Motorola filed suit
for damages in Illinois, and the action was consolidated with other cases
in a California multi-district litigation (“MDL”).179 The California MDL
court divided the purchase of the LCD panels into three categories: (1)
purchases of LCD panels by Motorola that were delivered directly to
Motorola facilities in the United States (“Category 1,” about 1% of
purchases); (2) purchases of LCD panels by Motorola’s foreign affiliates

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211

(1951)).
176. Id. at 771.
177. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d
816, 817 (7th Cir. 2014).
178. Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 09 C 6610, 2014 WL
258154, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2014). Unlike some inputs, LCD panels have no utility
apart from their component value. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 4.
179. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 11.
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that were delivered to the foreign affiliates’ manufacturing facilities
abroad, where they were incorporated into mobile phones that were later
sold to the United States (“Category 2”); and (3) purchases of LCD
panels by Motorola’s foreign affiliates that were delivered to the foreign
affiliates’ manufacturing facilities abroad and were later incorporated
into mobile phones sold outside the United States (“Category 3”).180
It was not disputed that the Category 1 purchases were subject to
the Sherman Act. 181 The issue was whether the price-fixing of either
Category 2 or Category 3 panels were actionable under the Sherman
Act. 182 The defendants argued that Motorola could not recover under
United States law for any panels that were initially delivered abroad
because these deliveries created only “foreign injury” not subject to
United States antitrust law. 183 Conversely, Motorola argued that they
were domestically injured by defendant’s conduct through the increased
price Motorola was paying to manufacture and import its LCD products
for sale in the United States.184
The California MDL court initially sided with the defendants,
holding that the defendants’ conduct could not involve imports because
it was Motorola, not the defendants, who imported the price-fixed
panels. 185 However, Motorola was granted leave to amend and file a
second amended complaint to add new allegations concerning the
defendants’ conduct in the United States, how Motorola was specifically
targeted, the extent of Motorola’s control over its subsidiaries, and “the
method by which global prices were negotiated and set by Motorola’s
procurement team in Illinois and the connection to Motorola’s foreign
injury.” 186 The defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint was denied, 187 as was their motion for partial summary
judgment, 188 and the case was remanded to the Northern District of

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 817.
Id. at 817-18.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12-13.
In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 785 F. Supp. 2d 835, 837, 844
(N.D. Cal. 2011).
187. Id. at 847.
188. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. C 09-5840 SI, 2012 WL
3276932, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012).
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Illinois. 189 On remand, the court granted the defendants’ motion for
reconsideration of the MDL court’s ruling and dismissed Motorola’s
claims based on overseas purchases by its foreign subsidiaries.190 The
court reasoned that even if there was a sufficient domestic effect, there
was not a “substantial” effect on American domestic or import
commerce, as required by the FTAIA.191
Without receiving any briefing, and without oral argument, the
Seventh Circuit issued a brief, unanimous opinion affirming the lower
court.192 First, the court held that there was no direct effect on United
States commerce.193 The court reasoned that the “effect of component
price-fixing on the price of the product of which it is a component is
indirect.”194 Second, the court held that the effect on domestic commerce
did not give rise to Motorola’s antitrust claim. 195 Finally, the court
concluded by noting the prevalence of global supply chains in the
current economy and predicted that to extend application of the Sherman
Act to the activities of the defendants in this case would result in an
“enormous[] increase [in] the global reach of the Sherman Act, creating
friction with many foreign countries.”196 However, if the Seventh Circuit
considered Motorola’s American parent company and foreign
subsidiaries as one unit, then the effect of the price-fixed LCD panels
would be direct, rather than indirect, and would give rise to Motorola’s
antitrust claim.197
Motorola petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing that the panel’s
decision conflicted with Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc. 198 and F.

189. Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 09 C 6610, 2014 WL
258154, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2014).
190. Id. at *10.
191. Id. at *9-10.
192. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola I), 746 F.3d 842
(7th Cir.), vacated & reh’g granted, 775 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2014).
193. Id. at 844.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 845.
196. Id. at 846.
197. See generally Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 723 (1977).
198. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The
Seventh Circuit held in Minn-Chem that the FTAIA “reaffirm[s] the well-established
principle that the U.S. antitrust laws reach foreign conduct that harms U.S. commerce.”
Id. at 858.
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Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,199 and would weaken antitrust
enforcement by the government.200 In Minn-Chem, the court recognized
that the “direct effect” requirement of the FTAIA simply addresses
whether the domestic effect is too remote from the ultimate effects on
United States commerce. 201 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in
Empagran held that the “gives rise to” requirement of the FTAIA
precludes cases where the plaintiff’s claims rests solely on independent
foreign harm.202 Thus, the FTAIA only “remove[s] from the Sherman
Act’s reach . . . commercial activities taking place abroad, unless those
activities adversely affect domestic commerce [or] import
commerce,”203 as Motorola argued was the case here.
Motorola asserted that the fact that the panels were purchased and
delivered abroad was not dispositive.204 Motorola claimed that the pricefixing activity abroad raised the prices of mobile cell phones in the
United States, thereby directly causing a domestic effect and satisfying
the “direct effect” requirement of the FTAIA.205 Furthermore, Motorola
argued that it satisfied the proximate cause standard of the “gives rise
to” requirement of the FTAIA because the foreign and domestic prices
“arise from the same, plaintiff-specific negotiations and acts of
conspiratorial price-fixing.”206
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion, after rehearing, followed the same
general line of reasoning as its vacated opinion.207 The court assumed
that Motorola met the “direct effect” prong of the FTAIA, but failed

199. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004). The
court concluded that a purchaser in the United States could bring a Sherman Act claim
under the FTAIA based on domestic injury, but a purchaser in Ecuador could not bring
a Sherman Act claim based on foreign harm. Id.
200. See Craig C. Corbitt & Aaron M. Sheanin, Appellate Courts Grapple with the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act—Plaintiffs’ Perspective, COMPETITION, Fall
2014, at 9.
201. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 858.
202. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159.
203. Id. at 161.
204. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 10-12, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics
Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-8003), 2014 WL
5510635, at *10-12.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 17-18.
207. Compare Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 817-18, with Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU
Optronics Corp. (Motorola I), 746 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2014).

666

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXI

under the “gives rise to” prong. 208 The court stated that the effect of
fixing the price of a component on the price of the final product was less
direct than the conduct in Minn-Chem where “foreign sellers allegedly
created a cartel, took steps outside the United States to drive the price up
of a product wanted in the United States, and then . . . sold that product
to U.S. Customers.”209 However, the court also found that the facts of
Motorola Mobility did not rise to the level of those in Minn-Chem,
which definitely precluded liability under the Sherman Act: the
“situation in which action in the foreign country filters through the
layers and finally causes a few ripples in the United States.” 210 As a
result, the court provided no guidance for determining when an effect is
direct, and instead simply assumed that Motorola had satisfied the
“direct effect” requirement.211 Additionally, rather than discuss in detail
whether the “gives rise to” prong of the FTAIA was satisfied, the bulk
of the opinion was dedicated to the Illinois Brick doctrine.212
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Motorola could not recover
from the foreign cartel members because it was an indirect purchaser of
the LCD panels and did not meet the requirements of the FTAIA.213
Additionally, the court held that the parent company and its foreign
subsidiaries were two separate entities, so that the FTAIA can prevent
“unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other
nations.” 214 Lastly, the court held that if Motorola and its foreign
subsidiaries were to be seen as a single entity, it would have been

208.
209.

Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 818-20.
Id. at 819 (quoting Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 860 (7th
Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
210. Id. (quoting Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 860) (explaining that this case “doesn’t
seem like ‘many layers’ resulting in just ‘a few ripples’ in the United States cellphone
market.”).
211. Id. (“We’ll assume that the requirement of a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect on domestic commerce has been satisfied.”).
212. Id. at 819-27. Illinois Brick did not deal with price-fixing as applied to a global
supply chain, and there is dicta in that case that might indicate it should not be applied
to Motorola’s situation. See infra Part III.B.1.
213. Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 824.
214. Id. (quoting F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164
(2004)). The Seventh Circuit assumed the cartel met the substantive requirements of the
FTAIA, but that Motorola did not meet the second FTAIA requirement that the conduct
“gives rise to” Motorola’s claim. Id.
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injured abroad when it purchased the price-fixed components. 215
However, the court failed to explain how the purchase of the price-fixed
components and subsequent import of cell phones into the United States
did not involve import trade or commerce, merely stating “[i]t was
Motorola, rather than the defendants, that imported these [LCD] panels
into the United States.”216
2. The Parent-Subsidiary Relationship in Motorola Mobility
One of Motorola’s several claims was that it functioned with its
subsidiaries as a single enterprise.217 “That is true both as a technical
matter—because Motorola . . . imported its LCD products for sale at a
higher cost—and as a matter of substance, because the corporate
distinction between Motorola and its subsidiaries ha[d] no antitrusteconomics relevance in either the LCD-panel or mobile-phone
market.” 218 The defendants’ anti-competitive conduct directly affected
Motorola in its capacity as an American parent company, not only
because Motorola controlled the purchases of its subsidiaries and
absorbed the higher manufacturing costs, but also because Motorola was
forced to pay taxes in the United States on its “repatriated” profits.219
The defendants argued that Motorola and its subsidiaries were not a
single entity, but rather separate corporations that Motorola created in
order to take advantage of foreign labor markets and foreign regulatory

215.
216.

Id. at 823.
Id. at 818. But cf. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 756 (9th Cir.
2014) (stating that the argument that AU Optronics is not an “importer” misses the
point; the panels were sold into the United States, falling squarely within the scope of
the Sherman Act); Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462,
470 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that “[f]unctioning as a physical importer may satisfy the
import trade or commerce exception, but it is not a necessary prerequisite,” and that the
exclusion could be satisfied because “defendants’ conduct target[ed] import goods or
services”). The Third Circuit further held that the “import [exclusion] is not limited to
importers, but also applies if defendants’ conduct is directed at an import market.”
Animal Sci. Prods, 654 F.3d at 471 n.11. In Motorola Mobility, it could be argued that
defendants targeted the U.S. market. However, a full discussion of Motorola’s target
theory is outside the scope of this Note.
217. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 46.
218. Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
219. Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief, supra note 51, at 6.
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environments.220 Their rationale was that any such increased costs were
incurred at the time of the foreign purchase of the LCD panels and that
Motorola did not pay any overcharges again when the phones with LCD
components were shipped to the United States. 221 However, the
defendants knew that all aspects of Motorola’s mobile phone business
began and ended with the American parent company.222 Further, they
admitted that “Motorola [stood] in the shoes of its subsidiaries for
purposes of asserting their claims.” 223 The defendants’ constant
emphasis on the separate existence of Motorola and its subsidiaries
“obscured the substantive reality of an integrated, company-wide
process for designing, building, importing, and selling Motorola
phones.”224 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit held that Motorola did not
have standing under the FTAIA. 225 The court instead held that
Motorola’s American parent corporation and its foreign subsidiaries
were not a single integrated enterprise.226
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Motorola Mobility precludes any
injured purchasers from recovering damages under the Sherman Act
from a cartel that had significantly harmed the United States
economy. 227 Direct purchasers are barred by the FTAIA, and indirect
purchasers (including United States consumers) are barred by Illinois
Brick, even where foreign conduct causes a severe domestic effect and a
mild foreign effect.228 As a result, Motorola suffered all of the injury

220. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 34, Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816 (No. 14-8003),
2014 WL 5510636, at *34. Defendants further argue that Motorola cannot ignore their
separate existence simply because it prefers U.S. antitrust remedies to foreign remedies.
Id.
221. Id. at 35.
222. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 7.
223. Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 220, at 4 (citing Coplay Cement Co.
v. Willis & Paul Grp., 983 F.2d 1435, 1442 (7th Cir. 1993)).
224. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 9.
225. Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 827.
226. Id. at 820. The court’s rationale for this is that “American law does not collapse
parents and subsidiaries (or sister corporations) in that way.” Id. While this may be true
legally, it is not true economically. See infra Part II.C.
227. Brief for the United States & the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
in Support of Neither Party at 6, Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816 (No. 14-8003), 2014 WL
4678234, at *6 [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
228. See generally Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816.
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associated with the defendants’ anticompetitive behavior in its capacity
as an American parent company.229
a. The Seventh Circuit’s Misunderstanding of the FTAIA
The Seventh Circuit’s decision to treat Motorola as a distinct entity
from its subsidiaries further impacted Motorola’s antitrust standing
under the FTAIA. This was in part due to a misunderstanding of the
“direct effect” prong of the FTAIA. The circuits are split on how they
interpret the definition of “direct” within the “direct effect” prong as
well as the meaning of the “gives rise to” prong.230
The Seventh Circuit, similar to the Second Circuit, has interpreted
“direct” to mean “reasonably proximate causal nexus.”231 In contrast, the
Ninth Circuit defines direct to mean “immediate consequence” or
“characterized by or giving evidence of a close especially logical,
causal, or consequential relationship.” 232 The issue with the Seventh
Circuit’s definition is that it does not satisfy the goal of deterrence.233
The text of the FTAIA couples “direct” with “reasonably foreseeable”
and “substantial.”234 That an effect must be “reasonably foreseeable” is
to require that it is reasonable to expect a company to be aware what
conduct would cause further harm. 235 A foreign company cannot be
deterred from harming United States commerce if it does not realize that
its actions would have such an effect.236 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s
definition of “direct” serves the objective of deterrence because if
229. Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief, supra note 51, at 6. However, Motorola could
have sued abroad, where the injury took place. Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 823.
230. Compare Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d
Cir. 2014), and Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) (en
banc), with United States v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 674, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2004).
231. See Lotes Co., 683 F.3d at 857; Minn-Chem, Inc., 683 F.3d at 857; see also
Makan Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries of the Sherman Act: Recent Developments
in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to Foreign Conduct, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 415, 430 (2005).
232. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d at 698.
233. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2nd. Cir. 1945)
(“We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch,
for conduct which has no consequences within the United States.”).
234. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2012).
235. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d at 680.
236. See Joseph E. Harrington, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA: A DeterrenceBased Definition of “Direct” Effect, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2014, at 4.
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foreign companies anticipate that they will be held liable when their
conduct caused harm, then they will be less inclined to pursue the
conduct that causes the harm.237
As for the “gives rise to” prong, in Empagran, the Supreme Court
explained that it is supposed to do no more than incorporate an antitrust
injury inquiry into the FTAIA. 238 The question in Empagran was
whether an anticompetitive price-fixing activity, that was in significant
part foreign, caused some domestic antitrust injury, and independently
caused separate foreign injury, gave rise to a Sherman Act claim.239 The
Court held that a domestic purchaser could bring a claim under the
Sherman Act and FTAIA, but a foreign purchaser could not bring a
claim based solely on foreign harm. 240 The Court characterized
“independent foreign harm” as foreign harm caused by a foreign
anticompetitive effect that is independent of any domestic
anticompetitive effect.241
In light of this characterization, the Seventh Circuit’s application of
the “gives rise to” requirement misreads Empagran. 242 The Supreme
Court in Empagran found that when plaintiffs claim independent foreign
harm, the FTAIA should be read to require: (1) “a domestic effect give
rise to ‘a claim’ for antitrust injury;” and (2) “a domestic effect give rise
to the plaintiff’s own claim at issue.” 243 In other words, the plaintiff
must have antitrust standing to assert, and, in fact must assert, the
antitrust injury it proffers as having arisen from a domestic effect.244
Although Motorola did not claim independent foreign harm, “the fact
that a domestic effect did not give rise to Motorola’s own claim or the
claim at issue should not have prevented Motorola from asserting that a
domestic effect gave rise to ‘a claim.’”245 As a result, Motorola should
have been able to satisfy the “gives rise to” prong of the FTAIA with
237.
238.

See id.
See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 173-74

(2004).
239. Id. at 155.
240. Id. at 159.
241. Id. at 156.
242. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 816,
824 (7th Cir. 2014).
243. Stutz, supra note 18, at 6.
244. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165; see also Stutz, supra note 18, at 6.
245. Stutz, supra note 18, at 7.
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“any cognizable antitrust injury arising from a domestic effect” because
it claimed that foreign harm proximately caused a United States
domestic effect, not that there was independent foreign harm.246
III. PROTECTING AMERICAN COMPANIES IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY:
PERMITTING THE FIRST AFFECTED UNITED STATES PURCHASER TO
SUE IN THE AFTERMATH OF MOTOROLA MOBILITY
A. WRONGFULLY DISTINGUISHING MOTOROLA MOBILITY FROM
COPPERWELD AND ILLINOIS BRICK
The interpretation of Motorola Mobility is inconsistent with
Copperweld and Illinois Brick. This section will discuss why the
Seventh Circuit improperly applied the precedent from these prior
antitrust cases.
1. Copperweld
The defendants in Motorola Mobility argued that the principle of
Copperweld—that a single corporate conglomerate cannot conspire with
itself in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act—had no bearing in
the case because Motorola was not defending itself against a section 1
conspiracy claim. 247 The defendants further argued that the injured
parties, Motorola’s subsidiaries, were foreign corporations complaining
about foreign injuries. 248 However, the focus on the corporate
relationship between Motorola and its subsidiaries missed the issue at
hand. 249 When it comes to protecting the American economy from
international cartels, the inquiry should not be whether Motorola
structured its own corporate relationships as “subsidiaries” or
“unincorporated divisions.” 250 In fact, the Supreme Court stated in
Copperweld that “[a]ntitrust liability should not depend on whether a
corporate subunit is organized as an unincorporated division or a wholly
owned subsidiary.”251 Furthermore, Copperweld condemned an antitrust
rule that would treat subsidiaries and divisions differently where it
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 220, at 34-35.
Id.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 26.
Id. at 27.
Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 772 (1984).
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“serves no valid antitrust goals [and] merely deprives consumers and
producers of the benefits [of] the subsidiary form.” 252 The Court was
concerned about the potential of such a rule to turn antitrust inquiries
into decisions made on the basis of corporate structure. 253 The Court
made clear that, when it comes to antitrust law, the consequences of
corporate-organizational decisions should be determined based on
questions of antitrust policy and economics.254
In breaking with the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, the Court
in Copperweld noted that its economic entity approach was consistent
with other areas of potential section 1 liability. 255 The Court
acknowledged that a corporation and its officers are separate actors, and
that a corporation and its divisions are formally separate. 256
Nevertheless, the Court did not hold a corporation and its officers or
divisions as “conspirators” when they carry out their business. 257
Instead, the Court treated them as a single economic entity, subject to
less rigorous scrutiny, thereby ensuring that the Sherman Act does not
dampen their “competitive zeal.” 258 Although Motorola Mobility does
not involve a parent-subsidiary relationship among conspirators, but
rather victims, the rationale in Copperweld should equally apply. The
only consideration that should have mattered in the outcome of
Motorola Mobility, regardless of the form in which Motorola chose to
organize its corporation, was that Motorola’s claims related directly to
conduct that deliberately harmed the United States.259 Thus, Motorola
and its subsidiaries should have been seen as one entity. If that were the
case, the direct effect of the price-fixed LCD panels on the United States
market should have been sufficient for Motorola to bring its claim.260

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 774.
Id.
Id. at 777.
Id.
Id. at 770-71 (1984).
Id. at 769 n.15.
Id. at 768.
Appellants Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 13.
15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2012).
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2. Illinois Brick
The fact that Motorola and its subsidiaries functioned as a single
economic unit means that the indirect purchaser doctrine likewise
cannot be sensibly applied. 261 In Motorola Mobility, Motorola’s
subsidiaries were wholly owned. 262 Given the nature of the wholly
owned subsidiary, it has been suggested that “courts should invoke the
[“own or control”] exception only to ensure that sellers do not insulate
themselves from suit . . . by strong-arming direct purchasers into
choosing not to sue.” 263 In this instance, the direct purchasers do not
have standing to sue because they are located in a foreign country, and
thus cannot complain about effects on United States commerce because
they are “upstream” from any effects that follow from importing the
finished product. 264 However, Motorola cannot raise its own claim
because it is “downstream” from the direct-purchaser subsidiaries, and
so, it is barred by Illinois Brick.265 This means that no one can recover
damages for the defendants’ conduct, despite its substantial harm on
United States commerce.266
If Motorola and its foreign subsidiaries were properly seen as a
single entity, then the Illinois Brick doctrine would not apply. 267 The
Court in Illinois Brick recognized that exceptions to the Hanover Shoe

261. See, e.g., Jewish Hosp. Ass’n v. Stewart Mech. Enters., Inc., 628 F.2d 971, 975
(6th Cir. 1980) (citing In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1162 (5th Cir.
1979)) (Illinois Brick does not apply where there is “such functional economic or other
unity between the direct purchaser and either the defendant or the indirect purchaser
that there effectively has been only one sale.”).
262. Cf. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969) (holding that the
defendant could not avoid liability under the Robinson-Patman Act for price
discrimination merely by channeling the illegal discount through its sixty percentowned subsidiary); In re W. Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973)
(holding that defendants controlled their direct customers either by acquiring their stock
or by arranging to finance their purchases). This can be contrasted with subsidiaries that
are partially-owned, and thus would not follow the same logic as is argued in this Note.
However, partially-owned subsidiaries fall outside the content of this Note.
263. Barbara H. Bares, Cecilia M. Fanelli, Todd I. Gordon & William F. Murphy II,
Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall: The Future of Indirect Purchasers in Antitrust
Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 328-29 (1978).
264. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 204, at 16.
265. Id. at 20.
266. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 18.
267. See generally Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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rule 268 have been urged for in other situations in which most of the
overcharge is purportedly passed on—for example, “where a price-fixed
good is a small but vital input into a much larger product, making the
demand for the price-fixed good highly inelastic.”269 However, the Court
in Illinois Brick rejected these exceptions.270
The significance of these two cases therefore depends on whether
Motorola and its subsidiaries were seen as a single unit.271 In Hanover
Shoe, the court did not endorse the “passing-on” defense against
middlemen who did not alter the goods they purchased before reselling
them.272 If Motorola’s subsidiaries were seen as a separate entity from
the parent company, they would fall under this “middlemen” category.273
However, if Motorola and its subsidiaries were seen as one entity, then,
similar to Illinois Brick, the “passing-on” defense would be unavailable
to the defendants because Motorola itself bought the LCD panels and
converted them into cell phones. 274 Therefore, under Hanover Shoe,
Motorola would be able to recover damages.275
The defendants in Motorola Mobility rejected the notion that
Motorola and its subsidiaries were a single entity and argued that neither
Motorola nor its subsidiaries have a claim because Motorola was barred
by downstream recovery.276 However, if the “own or control” exception

268. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 488 n.6. Citing
a lower court opinion, the Court agreed that “it is unnecessary to determine whether
[the plaintiff] had passed on the illegal burden because [the plaintiff’s] injury was
complete” when it purchased the price-fixed commodity. Id. This is because “the
general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first
step.” Id. at 490 n.8.
269. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 743-44; see also West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
314 F. Supp. 710, 745-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971)
(arguing that the pass-on theory should be permitted for middlemen that resell goods
without altering them).
270. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 744.
271. See id. at 735 n.15. In that instance, the “middlemen” were the shoe machinery
manufacturers, who were not permitted to assert a “passing-on” defense against its
customers. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 488 n.6.
272. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 735.
273. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 488 n.6.
274. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 204, at 19.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 20.
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applies, 277 and Illinois Brick’s bar on pass-through claims does not,
Motorola has antitrust standing and injury because it complains about a
“prototypical” antitrust harm, collusive price-fixing, that passed through
to it.278 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that injured parties in
downstream markets do have relevant injuries and antitrust standing
under the FTAIA.279 Therefore, Motorola has a viable claim for the harm
it suffered as a purchaser of the tainted cell phones in import commerce,
and has standing to sue under the FTAIA.
B. THE EFFECT OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN MOTOROLA
MOBILITY
The primary focus of the United States antitrust laws is to deter
behaviors that harm United States commerce.280 The Seventh Circuit’s
decision fails to consider the adverse effects it would have on two
economic policy goals: deterrence of cartels and promotion of the
efficient use of international supply chains relied upon by American
companies and consumers. 281 The facts of Motorola Mobility are
increasingly common in today’s interconnected global economy.282 It is
not unusual that an American company, which owns and controls
foreign subsidiaries as part of its supply chain, finds itself victimized by
a global cartel.283 In the last twenty-five years, international price-fixing
conspiracies have cost consumers around the globe more than $1
trillion. 284 The particular price-fixing conspiracy in Motorola Mobility
affected well over $23.5 billion in sales of LCD panels imported into the
United States and enabled conspirators to impose overcharges of more

277. Defendants do not contest that Motorola owned and controlled the relevant
subsidiaries, or that Motorola’s downstream injuries would therefore be actionable even
under Illinois Brick. Id. at 21.
278. Id. at 20.
279. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004)
(“[A]pplication of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct [under the
FTAIA] is . . . reasonable, and hence consistent with principles of prescriptive comity,
insofar as they reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign
anticompetitive conduct has caused.”).
280. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978).
281. See Smith, supra note 30, at 2063.
282. Duffy, supra note 117, at 1711-12.
283. Id.
284. Brief for AAI, supra note 10, at 2.
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than $2 billion on those imports.285 Consequently, both effective cartel
deterrence and the efficient use of international supply chains are policy
goals of exceptional public importance that have been hindered by the
Seventh Circuit’s decision.286
A number of prominent economists and academic organizations
submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Motorola.287 They argued that as
a matter of economic policy, purchases by foreign affiliates of American
companies “should be permitted to seek treble damages in U.S. courts to
deter the formation of cartels that harm U.S. consumers and
businesses.”288 The American Antitrust Institute (“AAI”) echoed these
policy concerns, arguing that the Seventh Circuit panel’s decision
undermines deterrence of foreign cartels that harm American businesses
and consumers.289 The AAI further criticized the panel’s decision “for
adopting a ‘super Illinois Brick rule’ that would preclude indirect
purchasers in the United States from recovery for injury caused by
foreign cartels.” 290 In this manner, they argued, the panel was
determined to combat an “explosion of litigation against international
cartels,” based on its belief that American consumers were harmed so
often that to permit recovery would open the floodgates.291
Congress designed the FTAIA to strike a balance between
protecting commerce and consumers while “avoiding unreasonable
interference with the regulation of foreign markets by other countries” in
respect of comity. 292 In the FTAIA context, comity is “‘prescriptive
comity’: the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the

285.
286.
287.

Id. at 2-3.
See generally Smith, supra note 30.
See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae Economists & Professors in Support of
Petitioner, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015) (No.
14-1122), 2015 WL 1777073 [hereinafter Brief of Economists & Professors].
288. Id. at 32.
289. Corbitt & Sheanin, supra note 200, at 9 (citing Brief for AAI, supra note 10, at
2).
290. Id. (citing Brief for AAI, supra note 10, at 5).
291. Stutz, supra note 18, at 8.
292. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Motorola
Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (No.
14-8003), http://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/505311/download [http://perm
a.cc/2DXK-8KHB].
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reach of their laws.”293 While there is a strong presumption that federal
statutes are to be construed to avoid interference with the sovereign
interests of other nations, the increasingly global economic and multilayered supply chains have made the protection of United States
commerce that much more important.294 There is no reason to believe
that Congress would have intended the FTAIA to depart from longsettled precedent that applies the Sherman Act to cartels that harm the
United States, but to instead largely immunize foreign cartels from
liability for the damage they cause American companies and
consumers.295
Furthermore, antitrust penalties imposed on international cartels
“are collectively inadequate to deter international cartels, in part because
many nations do not even have laws against international price-fixing
cartels.” 296 The Seventh Circuit’s ruling creates an incentive to
inefficiently reorganize a supply chain to change the purchaser to the
American parent company and the delivery location to the Untied States
for legal reasons. 297 This would result in the loss of benefits a
corporation would otherwise stand to gain from locating near key
foreign suppliers. 298 It would likewise force American companies to
forgo potential benefits from moving production offshore.299 Consider
this: it would be efficient for Motorola to purchase LCD panels
delivered in the United States, but not for LCD panels delivered abroad
to Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries. Therefore, in response to the legal
rule crafted by Seventh Circuit barring an antitrust claim based on LCD
panels delivered abroad, “Motorola would be incentivized to switch its
purchasing behavior to have its parent company, and not its foreign
subsidiaries, make future purchases and take delivery in the United
293. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
294. See Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 824 (stating that “[n]othing is more common
nowadays than for products imported to the United States to include components that
the producers bought to foreign manufacturers”); Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision
Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 412 (2d Cir. 2014) (acknowledging the “complex
manufacturing process is increasingly common in our modern global economy, and
[that] antitrust law has long recognized that anticompetitive injuries can be transmitted
through multi-layered supply chains.”).
295. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 12.
296. Brief of Economists & Professors, supra note 287, at 4.
297. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 24.
298. Id. at 25.
299. Id.
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States.”300 The outcome from the Seventh Circuit’s decision thus creates
economic inefficiencies that leave American consumers worse off.
Moreover, there is a chance that the Seventh Circuit’s ruling has the
unintended consequence of encouraging the creation of cartels by
foreign countries to attract business. 301 The rule would allow such
countries to permit the exploitation of American parent companies’
supply chains by selling to foreign subsidiaries barred from pursuing an
antitrust claim in United States courts, as was the case in Motorola
Mobility. 302 The result would lead to increased production costs and,
ultimately, higher prices of final United States consumer goods.303
Regardless of where the LCD panels were purchased or delivered,
this price-fixing conduct resulted in the elevation of the price of LCD
panels, which in turn elevated the price of the finished cellphones by the
exact same amount. 304 This is where the example provided in the
beginning of this Note rears its head.305 It does not matter whether an
LCD panel was sent to the United States and then manufactured into a
Motorola phone, manufactured into a Motorola phone in Asia and then
sent to the United States, or manufactured into a Motorola phone in Asia
and sold into the United States, because the substance of these
transactions is all the same.306 Rather, the only thing that should matter
is the substance of the actions: a price-fixed commodity was placed in a
product and shipped to the United States, effectively harming American
consumers.307
C. RESOLUTION: PERMITTING THE FIRST AFFECTED PURCHASER TO SUE
Courts should recognize an exception to the FTAIA in cases where
an antitrust violation makes its way through a wholly owned foreign
subsidiary into United States commerce. There is nothing within the
language of the FTAIA to prevent such an exception. 308 Rather, the
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Introduction.
Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
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FTAIA sets a “general rule placing all (nonimport) activity involving
foreign commerce outside” the reach of the antitrust laws, and then
makes exceptions for when “the conduct both (1) sufficiently affects
American commerce . . . and (2) has an effect of a kind that antitrust law
considers harmful.”309 Therefore, courts could abide by the FTAIA by
recognizing an exception that allows the first affected American
purchaser standing to sue when the antitrust activity originally occurs
abroad, but ultimately affects United States commerce provided that the
direct purchaser is a wholly owned entity of the first affected purchaser.
Given that $2 billion in overcharges on the import of LCD panels
resulted in Motorola Mobility, 310 an exception to the Illinois Brick
doctrine is warranted when a wholly owned foreign subsidiary of an
American parent corporation is the direct purchaser of a price-fixed
commodity. Several courts have observed that the bar to indirect
purchaser damages claims does not “apply when no purchaser could
obtain damages, for then there is no risk of double recovery (and no
need to calculate elasticities in order to apportion damages among
multiple tiers).”311 A new exception would permit damages claims by
the first purchaser affected in United States commerce when section
6(a)(2) of the FTAIA bars the direct purchasers’ claims. 312 This
construction would also permit enforcement of the antitrust laws without
implicating Illinois Brick’s concerns regarding multiple recoveries.313 If
courts do not recognize this exception, Motorola Mobility may have the
effect of excluding any private plaintiff from recovering damages under
the federal antitrust laws.314
This new exception would help resolve the standing issue presented
in Motorola Mobility. 315 Under Motorola Mobility, Motorola’s
subsidiaries could not sue pursuant to the Sherman Act because their
309.
310.
311.

F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 162 (2004).
Brief for the AAI, supra note 10, at 2-3.
See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas. Co., 350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003);
see also California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 n.6 (1989) (emphasizing that
Illinois Brick “was concerned not merely that direct purchasers have sufficient incentive
to bring suit under the antitrust laws . . . but rather that at least some party have
sufficient incentive to bring suit.”).
312. Brief for the United States, supra note 227, at 6.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 816,
821 (7th Cir. 2014).
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injuries occurred abroad.316 In turn, Motorola could not sue because it
did not make direct purchases from the cartel. 317 This interpretation
creates somewhat of a paradox where no private party can sue for the
antitrust violations in the United States, allowing the cartel to get away
with its antitrust violations.318 Although the application of the Sherman
Act should avoid “creating friction with many foreign countries,” 319
United States antitrust law needs to take an interest in protecting
American parent companies like Motorola from antitrust violations
abroad.
While Motorola’s American parent company should have fallen
under the “own or control” exception to Illinois Brick, the court rejected
this theory because the subsidiaries were incorporated under foreign
law.320 Given that the sole reason Motorola was prevented from claiming
the “own or control” exception is due to the location of its subsidiary,
the recognition of an exception under the FTAIA would help to resolve
this dilemma.321 If Motorola’s subsidiaries did not have a claim because
their injuries occurred abroad, Motorola should then have its own claim
as an American corporation that actually imported the goods tainted by
price-fixing into the United States for sale.322 This claim is justified in
both form and substance because Motorola’s parent corporation acted
alone in purchasing the phones while functioning with its subsidiaries as
a single entity. 323 The key point is that Motorola is both the first
purchaser in the United States and is the parent of its corporate family,
and is therefore the ideal party to sue to correct the antitrust injuries to
that family.324 Thus, an administrable exception to the indirect purchaser

316.
317.

Id.
Id. While Motorola could have sued abroad, they preferred to sue in the United
States, whose antitrust remedies were more favorable.
318. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics
Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015) (No. 14-1122), 2015 WL 1223711, at *29-30.
319. Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 824.
320. Id. at 823.
321. This exception would allow for indirect purchasers to sue if the direct
purchaser is a wholly owned foreign subsidiary and the antitrust violation has an impact
on United States commerce.
322. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 204, at 18.
323. Id.
324. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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doctrine, under the FTAIA, could be recognized to permit the first
affected purchaser in United States commerce to seek damages.
As with any doctrine, there is always a concern for over broadening
the indirect purchaser doctrine to a point where the exceptions swallow
the rule. However, this new exception would be narrowly limited to
granting only the first affected American purchaser standing to sue when
the antitrust activity originally occurs abroad, but ultimately affects
United States commerce provided that the direct purchaser is a wholly
owned entity of the first affected purchaser. Under this framework, the
exception would limit the doctrine’s expansion while simultaneously
allowing the indirect purchaser doctrine to evolve with the modern
globalized society. Moreover, the recognition of this exception would
uphold the broad purposes of Illinois Brick: avoiding duplicative
liability while promoting deterrence and compensating antitrust
victims.325
CONCLUSION
Given the increasing commonality of international supply chains,
the current FTAIA does not adequately protect the welfare of American
consumers. The current penalties in place by the FTAIA are insufficient
to deter foreign cartels, leading to substantial harms within the United
States market. For these economic reasons, American parent
corporations should be able to seek damages pursuant to the antitrust
laws for violations that occur abroad between wholly owned foreign
subsidiaries and international cartels. Given that parents and subsidiaries
are seen as a single economic entity in other antitrust contexts,
maintaining this economic outlook, despite the legal corporate
differences that may exist, would help resolve this apparent conflict.
Furthermore, creating an exception to allow for an indirect parent
corporation to sue on behalf of its direct wholly owned foreign
subsidiary would not go against the purpose of Illinois Brick: given that
it is the same umbrella corporation, there is no risk of duplicative
recovery. This exception would not unduly broaden the reach of the
Sherman Act, but rather allow American corporations to sue for antitrust
violations when those actions directly affect United States commerce.
The result would therefore protect the welfare of American consumers
and maintain the original purpose of the Sherman Act by promoting
325.

Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-47 (1977).
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competition while combating international cartels and conspiracies that
cause anticompetitive effects in the United States.

